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This is perhaps surprising because many relationalists situate their view in opposition to representational content, arguing that perception only relates the perceiver to concrete particulars in the environment and not to abstract contents or states of affairs (Travis, 2013). If this is correct, then contrary to proponents of ar, who deny that perceptual experience is representational, both rv and ar are committed to the existence of representational content in visual experience i.e. This is in turn claimed to entail the existence of representational content that is assessable for truth or falsity.
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On this view, the visual presentation of properties entails the existence of a set of conditions under which a given experience is accurate, or veridical, Footnote 5 i.e. One kind of argument that has been advanced in its favour, however, draws upon a supposed phenomenological datum concerning the presentation of properties in visual experience. Rv is the orthodox view among philosophers of perception, and commonly assumed rather than explicitly argued for. This yields a distinctive account of perceptual phenomenal character as being at least partly constituted by the external particulars that are perceived, rather than being explicable in terms of representational content, or as internally grounded. Footnote 4 According to ar, experiences do not afford awareness of particular objects, events or properties in virtue of representing anything to be the case, but rather furnish the perceiver with direct conscious awareness of them. Moreover, proponents of ‘austere’ forms of relationalism Footnote 2 ( ar) claim that this perceptual relation cannot be characterised solely in representational terms, Footnote 3 or, more cautiously, that the notion of representation plays no fundamental role in philosophical explanations of conscious perceptual experience. objects, events, and/or the properties they instantiate. Relational views of experience, such as Naïve Realism, on the other hand, characterise perceptual experience in terms of a psychologically primitive relation of ‘acquaintance’ Footnote 1 or conscious awareness between a subject and external mind-independent particulars e.g. For example, representing a visible surface to instantiate some colour, texture or shape property, a sound to have a certain volume or timbre, or an odour to have a specific olfactory quality. So while relationalists can and should allow that experiences have accuracy conditions, it does not follow from this that they have contents of any philosophically interesting or significant kind.Īccording to representational views of experience ( rv), to perceptually experience an object is to represent it as being some specific way. Consequently, the argument begs the question against the austere relational view, and so fails to establish the desired conclusion. Though Siegel’s argument purports to be neutral with respect to the metaphysics of perception, it relies upon an equivocation between the presentation of property-types and property-instances. This goes against proponents of ‘austere’ relationalism who deny that content plays a substantive role in philosophical explanations of conscious perceptual experience. An influential version of this argument -Susanna Siegel’s ‘Argument from Appearing’ - aims to establish the existence of content as common ground between representational and relational views of perception. This in turn might be thought to give rise to accuracy conditions for experience, and so content, regardless of which metaphysical view of perception one endorses. Visual perception is widely taken to present properties such as redness, roundness, and so on.